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BOOKS
Reviewed
A WmDmNESS BLL OF RiGcrs. By William 0. Douglas. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co. 1965. 192 pages. $5.95.
Modern technology, which gives millions a shorter work week and
the affluence to enjoy this new leisure, has contributed significantly to
the demand for recreational areas. As a result, the debate over public
management of our natural resources is focusing not only on questions
of regulation of commercial exploitation but also on questions of preservation and development of resources for outdoor recreational use.
The dichotomy between preservation and development is manifested
by two clearly recognizable camps into which outdoor recreationists have
split. The general outdoor recreationist maintains that commercial exploitation can often be reconciled with recreational purposes and that the
goal of each development should be to permit both recreational and commercial use of the site1 This type of development is exemplified by Lake
Powell, now forming behind the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado
River. The lake generates hydroelectric power and permits the Upper
Colorado Basin states' to store water for their own use and for delivery
to the Lower Basin states and Mexico in accordance with the 1922 Colorado River Compact;' simultaneously the lake has motel facilities and
camping sites and is a mecca for power-boaters.
Challenging those who propose dual recreational and commercial use
are the conservationists who believe many potential recreational sites
should be preserved as wilderness areas by restricting permitted uses to
those compatible with the stability of the biotic community. They would
apply the definition of wilderness contained in the 1964 Wilderness Act:
"A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself
is a visitor who does not remain" Such conservationists would not have
i. The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission has adopted a sixfold classification of
outdoor areas: high-density, general outdoor, natural-environment, unique natural, primitive, and
historic and cultural sites. See Clawson & Knetsch, Outdoor Recreation Research: Some Concepts and
Suggested Areas of Study, 3 NA'rau RrsouRCEs J. 250, 26o (1963). For purposes of this Review, the
general outdoor and natural-environment classifications will be combined to contrast the preferences
of their users with the preferences of those who advocate unique natural and primitive areas.
2. Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
3. The construction of Glen Canyon Dam makes it possible for the Upper Basin states to store
surplus water in wet years and release it in dry years to meet their delivery obligation.
4. 'WildernessAct § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (x964).
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built the Glen Canyon Dam but would have preserved the natural character of the canyon by limiting its use to hikers, naturalists, and rapidsrunning enthusiasts.
Mr. Justice Douglas is our nation's most prestigious conservationist.
In his latest book, A Wilderness Bill of Rights, he states the case for
wilderness preservation; but, more important, he proposes what he believes are the necessary administrative regulations and laws for wilderness preservation. His thesis is simple: Natural-resource management decisions requiring the decision-maker to choose among wilderness preservation, commercial exploitation, and general.outdoor recreation should be
made in favor of wilderness preservation because its value is greater than
the value of technological growth or general outdoor recreation.
This reviewer agrees that wilderness preservation is an urgent and
worthy national goal but is unwilling to make it the controlling factor
in the range of situations suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas. The sweep
of his proposals raises two fundamental and unanswered policy questions.
(i) Why must the recreational needs of a large majority of our citizens,
principally those who live in urban areas, be subordinated to the preferences of a few conservationists? (2) To what extent should economic criteria enter into wilderness preservation decisions in view of the potential
impact of these decisions on the nation's economy? This Review examines
the basic assumptions of Mr. Justice Douglas' thesis and two of his specific
proposals in light of these questions and suggests an approach to making
resource management decisions.
Mr. Justice Douglas recognizes that the initial stumbling block faced by
conservationists is that "[w]ilderness values may not appeal to all Americans."'5 He meets this problem by arguing that while wilderness defenders
may be an idiosyncratic minority, the values they represent are "important
in a free society. 8 And, since one function of a democratic government
is to protect the rights of minorities, wilderness advocates are entitled to
the guarantee "that large areas of the original America will be preserved in
perpetuity."'
The analogy between wilderness values and minority rights does not
seem valid. Mr. Justice Douglas uses the analogy to argue that the values
gained from wilderness preservation are superior to those which would
be gained from any other use of the area. But all groups-the commercial exploiters, the general outdoor recreationists, and the conservationists
-have valid claims against our natural resources; the problem is choosing which one or ones to recognize in a given instance. For example, it
5. P. 25.
6. P.26.
7. Ibid.
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is difficult to distinguish, as a general proposition, between the demands
of the skier for accessible slopes and those of the backpacker for the solitude of a primitive area. But neither claim should be excluded from consideration by decision-makers who must decide on the optimum use of
an area. Consequently, in choosing between wilderness preservation and
some form of development, the decision-maker ought to be more responsive to the recreational habits of the American people than Mr. Justice
Douglas suggests.
Thus, in arriving at decision-making criteria it is necessary to know
the recreation preferences of the citizens affected by the decision. Unfortunately, little empirical research has been done to date on this subject,
but perhaps the following generalizations can be made. Wilderness-users
are primarily persons in middle and upper income brackets who have
both the inclination and money to travel substantial distances for extended
periods.8 Many more people prefer general outdoor recreation-water or
winter sports facilities, developed camping grounds, and cabin sites. Moreover, since ninety per cent of the population will soon be concentrated in
urban areas and will be enjoying increased leisure, accessible recreational
sites must be provided for them. Yet Mr. Justice Douglas seems to suggest
that the demands of urban dwellers and those who prefer general recreation should not be considered where the demands conflict with wilderness
preservation objectives. He would partially resolve the conflict by changing their preferences. He asks, "How can we get more American families
out of their cars into hiking shoes and backpacks . . . ? How can we

introduce more wilderness adventure into American life ?"'
The danger of this approach becomes apparent when applied to an
area such as southern California. In the near future this region must make
a number of decisions involving development of wilderness areas within
a one- or two-hour drive from Los Angeles. If Mr. Justice Douglas' approach were followed none of these areas would be developed for general
outdoor recreation, and those desiring general outdoor recreation would
incur substantial burdens by having to travel long distances to find it °
8. Clawson & Knetsch, supra note i, at 259. Figures cited by Mr. Justice Douglas show that the
average annual income of a wilderness-user was $7,500, with 50% of these users having an income
over $8,ooo. The figures also indicate that 65% of the users had college training and that 50% were
of the managerial class. P. 18.
9. P. ",.
so. In discussing a recent controversy over development of a wilderness area near Los Angeles,
Mr. Justice Douglas said, "If noses were counted and a majority vote allowed to govern, San Gorgino
would be quickly converted to skiing, for the number of prospective skiers would far exceed the
hikers and campers. ... An appreciation of America in its wilderness state is important for all
young people. Preserving such a training area near a large metropolitan area such as Los Angeles in
contrast to its conversion into ski runs, ski lifts, hotels, restaurants, and roads, is reason enough for
the decision of the Forest Service [to preserve the wilderness]." P. 96. The disturbing aspect about
this comment is not Mr. Justice Douglas' position on a particular controversy but his bias against general outdoor recreation.
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The discussion has to this point assumed the problem to be one of deciding conflicts between recreationists with different preferences. This assumption does not take into account the needs of the urban poor, often
minority groups, most of whom do not have the financial ability to pursue outdoor recreation. However, it seems safe to assume that as their
standard of living improves, their preferences for outdoor recreation will
be similar to those of the general outdoor recreationist. In anticipating
their needs, decision-makers should provide areas accessible to, yet removed from, the city and capable of handling large numbers of people.
In this way the urban poor will be encouraged to spend their leisure time
outside the ghetto. Hopefully, the availability of usable recreational facilities will help to reduce the tensions which result from being confined
to the ghetto. The problem of the urban poor is another reason for not
restricting recreational areas surrounding a metropolitan area to wilderness uses for the effect of restriction may be to confine to the urban center
those who most need an exposure to a nonurban environment.
Certainly the demand for general recreational areas must be balanced
against the need for wilderness areas. But Mr. Justice Douglas' approach
is too rigid when applied to primitive areas surrounding a large metropolitan center. What is needed is a master plan for recreation that accommodates both preferences, rather than a policy which tolerates only wilderness 1 In the second chapter, "Wilderness and Its Values," Mr. Justice
Douglas describes the specific values which justify the need for wilderness preservation. He contends that wilderness aids in understanding
America's heritage, is necessary for certain forms of wildlife, and "is
also a refuge for automated man."' 2 Preservation can be economically
justified because it "is critical in the search for botanical and biological
specimens useful to man."'" Such justifications recognize the difficulty of
incorporating wilderness values into the economic formulas used in making other resource management decisions. It is easier, for example, to
calculate the cost-benefit ratio" in deciding the feasibility of a project
than it is to quantify the more subjective benefits derived from designating an area as a wilderness. This difficulty has led conservationists to
seek to eliminate economic considerations from all wilderness preservaii. For a discussion of the type of regional planning that encompasses recreational needs, see
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA 21

(1965).

12. P. 31.
13. P. 3 6.
14. A formula used by the federal government to determine whether a public works project, such
as a multipurpose dam, is economically justified. Basically, the ratio is derived by calculating the costs
of the project and comparing them to the primary project benefits (value of products and services
directly resulting from the project) and attributable secondary benefits (value added to the economy
in addition to the primary benefits). If the ratio exceeds x:i, the project is deemed feasible. See generally Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5
NATuRui.REsoucEs J. 1, 12 (1965). For a penetrating criticism of the current use of the ratio, see
Hammond, Convention and Limitationin Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6 NATURAL REso RcES J. 195 (z966).
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tion decisions on the theory that the subjective values are more important.
To this reviewer, wilderness decisions require a choice among competing uses. A rational system of decision-making should try to find a common denominator among the values represented by each of the competing uses. The most promising solution may be in the attempt to assign
dollar values to recreational benefits. Economists have agreed that the
dollar value of a recreational project can theoretically be computed by
determining the "value added" to the local economy and the value of the
recreation to the user." These calculations would determine the benefits
gained from a given recreation decision.
To measure the cost of the decision, these benefits can be compared
with the benefits derived from alternative choices. For example, if the
dollar benefits derived from preserving an area as wilderness are less than
those which would be obtained if the area were opened to general outdoor recreation or commercial exploitation, the decision-maker could estimate the added cost of the decision to preserve wilderness. The determination of this cost is important because in many instances Mr. Justice Douglas and other conservationists are in effect demanding a subsidy. They
are asking those who do not use the wilderness areas to bear part of the
costs of wilderness preservation for the benefit of those who do. Society
may well decide that it desires to grant the subsidy, but at least basing
the natural resources allocation decision expressly on "values involved or
foregone" may help to "provide a more objective basis for decision making than now exists." 6
Much of the foregoing discussion presupposes highly developed economic models. Unfortunately, present-day recreation economists simply
do not know how to assign dollar values to many of the benefits allegedly
arising from wilderness use. This does not make the approach less valid
as an ultimate goal; rather it calls for more intensive research into the
economics of recreation. Nor would such an approach demand that natural-resources decisions become merely a matter of applying predetermined formulas, for economists are now beginning to realize that a proper
resource decision involves a number of social and political, as well as economic, factors' However, if the conservationist wishes to be accorded a
significant voice in natural-resource management decisions-as Mr. Justice Douglas desires him to be-he must be prepared to answer the kinds
of economic questions asked in making other resource management decisions.
In the chapter entitled "Ingredients of a Bill of Rights" Mr. Justice
x5. See Trelease, supranote 14, at 20-21.
16. Clawson & Knetsch, supranote x, at 266.
17- Id. at 272.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19: Page 895

Douglas discusses the current natural-resource management policies of
the federal government, such as the congressional preference for multiple
use,"8 the Bureau of Land Management's requirement that grazing lands
be fenced, and the allowance of certain kinds of motorized vehicles on
forest trails. He criticizes these policies as destructive of wilderness and
urges the adoption of policies aimed at preservation. He also proposes
reforms in the decision-making procedures to ensure greater access for
citizens to federal agencies through more mandatory public hearings and
expanded definitions of standing to contest administrative actions1
Although Mr. Justice Douglas makes a wide range of suggestions, the
remainder of this Review examines only two of his suggested approaches
to wilderness preservation: his standards for withdrawing land from commercial exploitation to create national parks or wilderness areas and his
plan to restrict hydroelectric dam construction.
Proposals to create a wilderness area or national park, either by purchasing land or by withdrawing land from entry for commercial exploitation, are generally opposed by regional interests fearing a severe decline
in the local economy. To date decision-makers have been content to allow
commercial exploitation to continue until a specific decision for purchase
or withdrawal is made. Mr. Justice Douglas is discontent with this
ad hoc method of making decisions and concludes, "Our need for wilderness should keep us from destroying it merely to keep loggers and road
builders employed."2 However, there may be another approach which
could help to accommodate the competing interests of the conservationist
and the commercial exploiter, namely government aid in finding new
sources of income for the regional economy to replace those lost by the
decision to create a national park or wilderness preserve.
The usefulness of such an approach can be seen in the current controversy over the proposed Redwood National Park in northern California.
A good case can be made that in the long run the park will bring in sufficient income to offset the losses to the lumber industry. Nonetheless, the
regional economy will suffer, at least in the short run. Sawmills may have
to curtail their operations, and people will be out of work. Since the
i8. The Multiple Use Act S§ 1-2, I6 U.S.C. SS 528-29 (1964), provides: "It is the policy of
Congress that the national forests . . . shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber,

watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.. . . The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized . . . to
develop and administer the renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use and

sustained yield of the several products and services obtained therefrom." Multiple use is defined as
"[t]he management of all of the various renewable surface resources . . . so that they are utilized in
the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people; making the most judicious use

Multiple Use Act 9 4, 16
of the land for some or all of these resources or related services .
U.S.C. § 531 (1964).
ig. See Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALnw. L. Rnv. 381 (1962); Comment,
StandingTo Sue and Conservation Values, 38 CoLo. L. REV. 391 (I966).
20. P. 95.
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park would be used primarily during the summer, it probably would not
generate sufficient full-time jobs to replace those displaced by its creation.
Since the redwoods are removed from any metropolitan area, the demands
of-and the dollar value of benefits to-the general outdoor recreationist
are not as great as in the earlier examples. Consequently, the total economic benefits of creating the park probably would be less than the economic benefits of the existing commercial exploitation and limited recreational activities.
However, since the primary problem is whether or not the redwoods
should be preserved, the controversy presents an excellent case for basing
the final decision on noneconomic criteria. The redwoods are a unique
phenomenon, and thus there is a strong argument that the decision must
be made in favor of wilderness lest the qualities of the area be lost forever.
This reviewer believes that Congress should lessen the impact of a
wilderness preservation decision by adopting a system for compensating
the region for economic losses resulting from such a decision. In the case
of the redwoods, the problem is one of protecting the regional economy
when the public has decided the highest use of the redwoods is to preserve them. The federal government should help the regional economy
find replacement sources of income by using the remaining resources of
the area. Bodies such as the Appalachian Regional Commission, which is
empowered to "encourage private investment in industrial, commercial,
and recreational projects,"" could be established for this purpose.
Mr. Justice Douglas' discussion of hydroelectric dams reflects traditional
conservationist concern with the construction of dams. Conservationists
maintain that rivers which have scenic qualities should be preserved in
their free-flowing state. Jurisdiction over dam construction on navigable
waterways, which are the primary areas of concern, rests either with Congress or with the Federal Power Commission, depending on whether the
dam will be built with federal funds or with state or private funds." Each
authority presents its own peculiar problems for the conservationist. With
Congress the problem is bringing political pressure to bear in order to
defeat authorization of the project. With the FPC the problem is to make
21. Appalachian Regional Development Act of x965, § xo2(6), 40 U.S.C. § 102(6), app. A
(x965). A step in this direction was taken in one of the legislative proposals for a Redwood National
Park which provides for payments to local taxing districts for a five-year period to give them transitional financial aid for the reduction of their tax rolls caused by the creation of the park. S. 2962, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2965).
22. Congress has practically unlimited power to construct dams under the commerce and general
welfare clauses. See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAl. RxsourtcFs J. 1, 17 (1963); Goldberg, Interposition-Wild
West Water Style, 17 STANf. L. REv. I, 34-35 (1964). However, Congress often prefers state or private

to public development. If Congress decides not to develop a navigable stream with public funds, jurisdiction to license individual, corporate, or state development for purposes of generation of hydroelectric power rests with the FPC. Federal Power Act 5 2o2(e), I6 U.S.C. § 797(e) (x964).
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the project's impact on the scenic qualities of the river a determining factor in the decision to grant or deny a license application.
Mr. Justice Douglas would solve both problems with the standard that
"dams for hydroelectric power and dams for flushing rivers of sewage
should be deemed presumptively harmful to the public interest.:2 Political realities make it unlikely that Congress will ever adopt such a restrictive standard for itself or impose it on the FPC. However, a more limited
and thus possibly more acceptable standard is suggested by a recent Second
Circuit decision.
In Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. FPC2 the FPC licensed
a pump storage project on the Hudson River at historic Storm King Mountain. The issue as framed by the Commission was "[i]f on this record
Con Edison has available an alternative source for meeting its power
needs which is better adapted to the development of the Hudson River
for all beneficial uses, including scenic beauty, this application should be
denied."" The FPC granted the license. The court set aside the license
and remanded the case for further proceedings because the FPC had
failed to consider sufficiently the feasibility of alternative sources of power
which would not impair the scenic qualities of the area. Read narrowly,
the decision only reverses the FPC for failing to follow its own rigorous
conservation standard. But the broad language of the opinion indicates
the court desired to place an affirmative burden on the FPC to demonstrate that alternative sources of power are not feasible whenever a project
will adversely affect a unique scenic area.
The court based its result in part on a construction of section io (a)
of the Federal Power Act," which requires a project to "be best adapted
to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or
waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce ... and
for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes." Section
io(a) had previously been construed to give the Commission the discretion to deny a license for a hydroelectric dam when it would impair
such unique qualities of the river as the habitats for wildlife and the
opportunities for fishing and canoeing Scenic Hudson can be read to
make denial of a license mandatory under section io(a) when a feasible
alternative source of power is available.
23. P. 139.
24. 354 F.2d 6o8 (2d Cir. 1965).
25. Id. at 612.

26. 16U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
27. In Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC 2x6 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954), the court sustained the
FPC's denial of a license with the following words: "Ve think that the Commission was well within
its powers in determining that even at the expense of a relatively small water-power development, the
unique and special recreational values of the lower 22 miles of the Namekagon River should not be
destroyed." Id. at 512. The court described the river in language rarely seen in a case report: 'Tassing
by heavily wooded banks of either side, with no noise or sound to be heard from highways or railroads, the canoeist has the illusion of being in a forest primeval, far from civilization" Ibid.
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The Scenic Hudson case invites a fundamental review of national
power policy and its relationship to the preservation of free-flowing rivers.
The policy has traditionally been based on a preference for hydroelectric
power. However, technology has developed new sources of energy which
do not require the construction of dams. The possibility is real that in the
near future energy derived from nuclear fission and the sun may sharply
decrease the demand for hydroelectric power.!8 Thus, it may be possible
to reconcile the need for cheap sources of energy with preservation of the
scenic qualities of our rivers.
This reviewer believes hydroelectric power developments should not
be preferred when feasible alternative sources exist. In such a situation the
arguments advanced by Mr. Justice Douglas for preserving scenic qualities
are applicable.
These arguments should be reflected in an amendment to the Federal
Power Act. Section io(a) should be amended to ensure that whenever a
proposed project will impair the unique scenic, recreational, and wildlife
qualities of a river the Commission's decision to grant a license will be
sustained only upon a showing that no feasible alternative sources of power
are available. The standard should be limited to unique qualities of freeflowing water because these are the types of rivers which most need to
be preserved rather than developed for general outdoor recreation. A
broader standard may impede projects which have desired general outdoor recreational benefits. The standard of "unique scenic qualities" is
admittably vague, but much of the vagueness is inherent in the nature
of the problem with which it attempts to deal. It is a standard with which
the courts have previously worked,29 thus indicating that the standard
can be made workable'
A Wilderness Bill of Rights was written to make the general public
aware of the need to incorporate wilderness considerations into naturalresource management decisions. But the sweep of Mr. Justice Douglas'
approach and his failure to consider the conflicting societal needs for use
of wilderness land assure that his book will be convincing only to those
already converted. To have an effective voice in the decision-making process, the conservationist must heed such warnings as the one recently
sounded by the chairman of the Midwest Open Lands Association:
28. Glenn T. Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, predicts that "within thirtyfive years all new private power plants will be operating on nuclear energy." N.Y. Times, May 17,
1965, at 34, col. 2.
29. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.,d 6o8 (2d Cir. 1966); Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 2x6 F.2d 509 ( 7 th Cir. 1954); Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power
Co., ISI F. ioII (D. Colo. IgIO), rev'd, 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
30. For one approach toward incorporating scenic criteria into natural-resource management
decisions, see Twiss & Litton, Resource Use in the Regional Landscape, 6 NATORAL Rasotmacs J. 76
(x966).

